In the coming months, Uzbekistan will host high-profile summits between Central Asia with the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. As global geopolitics continue to be in flux, Uzbekistan in particular, and Central Asia in general, are adapting to this evolving world. Hosting high-level meetings with Brussels & the Gulf States and recent bilateral discussions with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and even the Taliban suggest that Tashkent is eager to engage with current and new partners and approach unavoidable, high-risk neighbors.
On April 3-4, the first-ever European Union-Central Asia summit will take place in Uzbekistan. The President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen will attend. Bilateral trade reached almost USD 50 billion (EUR 47.6 billion) in 2022, not including investments. Many European states rely on Central Asia for energy, and many European energy and mining companies operate across Central Asia, while the importance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (commonly known as the Middle Corridor) continues to grow. A month prior, on 4 March, the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting will take place in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, and will address summit preparations.
Brussels is interested in engaging Central Asia further. “To further deepen bilateral ties, the EU has negotiated enhanced partnership and cooperation agreements (EPCAs) with all Central Asian countries, except Turkmenistan,” explained a recent press statement about the upcoming meeting. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev will be tasked with ensuring that the two blocs can further connect.
Also, the second Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Central Asia summit is scheduled to take place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan; according to media outlets, the gathering will occur in May. Central Asian governments are eager to obtain more investment from the Gulf and increase trade. So far, trade between the two sides is small, but expectations for the upcoming summit are high. “Not only is the GCC interested in the minerals, metals, and agricultural commodities that Central Asia can offer, but both regions are moving toward economic diversification,” explained Nader Habibi, professor at Brandeis University. President Mirziyoyev recently visited Kuwait and met with Emir Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. According to media reports, the two heads of state discussed bilateral cooperation, but we can assume that the upcoming GCC-Central Asia summit was also mentioned.
The Second Ministerial Meeting of the Strategic Dialogue “Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf – Central Asia” (GCC + Central Asia), April 15, 2024. Photo: EMBASSY OF TURKMENISTAN to WASHINGTON, U.S.
It is worth noting that Gulf companies appear to have a growing interest in trading and investing in Central Asia; Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are particularly invested in creating an investment-friendly environment. Laziz Kudratov, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade, has explained how his government made a “conscious effort” to develop new sectors such as pharmaceuticals, IT, and renewable energy, which included developing IT parks and special economic zones. Kazakhstan’s Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) has a specific department for Islamic finance, while Tashkent is similarly looking to develop an Islamic finance sector.
As for specific initiatives, a January visit by President Mirziyoyev to the United Arab Emirate and a meeting with President Mohammed bin Zayed included discussions on six areas, including investment protection and intergovernmental financial cooperation, while the 2025–2027 period has been declared a “New Era of Economic Partnership” to boost trade and investment. Tashkent’s goal is to increase bilateral trade with the UAE “tenfold by 2030 and elevate the investment portfolio to an impressive USD 50 billion.” Meanwhile, the UAE and Kazakhstan aim to improve the former’s presence in industries like food and agriculture, healthcare, fintech, and education tech. Qatari companies are also present in Kazakhstan; one new project is the construction of a hydroelectric power station in the Irtysh River.
Ideally, future investment and trade with Uzbekistan will encourage the government to avoid depending on cotton, a cornerstone of the country’s economy. Unfortunately, cotton requires substantial water resources, which Uzbekistan does not have. Climate change is making Central Asian droughts harsher and more destructive, hence, Uzbekistan’s dependency on cotton must stop. (I have co-authored an extensive report on water security issues in Central Asia for the Atlantic Council, a think tank in Washington, DC).
Finally, it is important that a couple of bilateral discussions occurred in February between Tashkent and two polar opposite governments. First, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Affairs Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov had a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The topics discussed reportedly included “close cooperation in [the] expanding strategic partnership…in all spheres,” including trade volume. Given the Trump administration’s focus on critical minerals and rare earth elements, to the point that Washington and Kyiv are negotiating them while the war with Russia continues, Tashkent could use its critical mineral deposits as a hook to increase diplomatic and trade relations with the United States.
Moreover, February 22-23, a delegation of the Taliban arrived from Afghanistan to Tashkent, led by Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. At Tashkent airport, Baradar was welcomed by Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjayev, the president’s special representative for Afghanistan, Ismatulla Ergashev, and the head of Afghanistan’s diplomatic mission in Tashkent, Abdula Ghaffar Teravi. The two-day included discussions with Uzbek officials about “boosting trade, transit, and economic cooperation,” including attracting Uzbek investment to the country. According to the Uzbek media, two specific projects discussed were the Trans-Afghan railway project and the 500 kV “Surkhan to Pul-e-Khumri” power transmission line from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Uzbek investors are reportedly interested in constructing a cement plant in Samangan province.
Given that the global military powers are focused elsewhere, there is no interest in a new military operation in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power. The Taliban remains a terrorist organization that oppresses the Afghan population, particularly women; unfortunately, they are not going anywhere. Hence, Afghanistan’s neighbors will have to learn to co-exist with them. The Chinese government is eagerly engaging the Taliban to ensure a live-let-live arrangement and secure access to Afghanistan’s many minerals and other resources. The visit by a Taliban delegation to Tashkent can similarly be interpreted as the Uzbek government acknowledging that it will have to exist with a potentially violent neighbor.
The upcoming EU-Central Asia and GCC-Central Asia summits in Uzbekistan will likely end without any milestone diplomatic agreements. However, important trade and investment agreements could be signed, making both summits important to monitor. Meanwhile, the recent discussions with Washington and the Taliban in the same month highlight the balancing act Tashkent needs to conduct. Engaging Washington and the Western world is a priority, but having the Taliban as a next-door neighbor demands some level of interaction. Uzbekistan is a country to monitor to understand how Central Asia adapts to the evolving geopolitics and increasingly broken world.
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